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1. INTRODUCTION 
Many studies have investigated the prospects for returns, the budgetary and financing 
background and energy management effects of the new nuclear power plant units to be built 
at Paks. This document seeks to complement previous economics-based studies by adding a 
new criterion. The key question in our analysis is whether the power plant company will be 
capable of independent operations in an economic sense - or will its survival depend on 
further additional aid by the owner, i.e. via the central budget, after its commissioning? We 
shall examine from a corporate perspective in what ways the already disclosed financing 
terms and conditions may affect the everyday operations of the power plant company. In 
other words, we are seeking an answer to the question of whether the owner‟s expected 
financial commitment (in our case, due to the fact of State ownership, of taxpayers) will end 
once the EUR 2.5 billion own contribution (approximately HUF 765 billion at today‟s rates) 
specified in an international contract is paid out to make real the amount of investment in the 
period 2015 to 2025. 
This topic is made particularly timely by the recent decision of the European Commission 
to authorize State aid to the British Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant.1 The Hungarian 
government, however, still insists that no State aid will be needed for Paks-2. According to 
their position, “the analyses have shown that no State capital support is needed to ensure 
the conditions of its paying for itself.”2 
In our view, if the company is to operate in a market company, it must be able to operate 
in a self-sustainable way, without being in need of continuous capital injection due to its 
losses. Of course, it is conceivable that, for short periods, the owner will provide bridging 
support to the power plant company, but such support should not become oft-occurring as 
this might then lead to permanent market distortion and may prohibit State aid. According to 
Article 288 of the Commission decision on the Hinkley Point C Nuclear Power Station, “State 
aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member States.” If Paks-2 
NPP can remain operational in the long run only through the additional capital injections of 
the State as owner of the company, that would obviously grant the company a selective 
advantage relative to other power generators as fulfils the conditions applicable to State 
aid. Therefore, our investigation will focus primarily on specifying the market conditions 
under which government expectations of realizing the Paks-2 NPP project without State aid 
can be met.3  
 
 
 
                                                          
1The Commission decision concerning the Hinkley Point C Nuclear Power Station can also be seen in Hungarian in the 
Official Journal of the EU (28 April 2015: pp. 40-111).  
2Written answer by János Lázár, the Minister heading the Prime Minister‟s Office, to the question of MP Bernadett Szél, 22 
October 2014: 
3As an addendum to whether the establishment of new nuclear power plant capacities without State aid is a realistic 
option, let us quote Point 273 from the Hinkley Point C decision: “The UK disagreed with comments suggesting that the market 
would come up with investment in new nuclear capacity in the absence of aid.” 
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Our analysis will first review some earlier papers on the ROI issue and present their 
respective methodologies and main findings. Then, we will present our own methodology 
based on a shareholder value approach that is common in the field of corporate finance. To 
be able to calculate return on investment, we prepared the financial statement forecasts of 
the power plant company for the total investment period (2015-2025) and for the period of 
operations (2026-2085). To forecast the financial statements, we came up with several 
parameters that can be subjected to a sensitivity analysis. The paper presents scenarios 
primarily for the wholesale (sales) prices attainable by the power plant and the effects of 
the expected capacity utilization rates on return, yet the calculation model enables us to 
analyze the impact of many other factors as well. The model comprises a total of 20 
parameters that can be altered to make simulations of expected returns and financial 
viability. 
We have relied extensively on the most recent market forecasts and data to specify the 
expected market power price and capacity utilization scenarios. According to the forecast of 
the European Commission,4 the price level of European power generation will increase by 
2.4% on average per year at constant prices until 2020, but by 2021-2030 and 2031-2040 
prices will be going down by an annual 0.17% and 0-19%, respectively. This implies a price 
increase of 23% by 2026 at constant prices, which will go down to 21% by 2030. According to 
a fresh paper by the British system operator,5 the wholesale UK power price expected for 
2026 will be 96.1, 76 and 54.2 £/MWh under the high, average and low market prices 
scenarios, respectively - that is, calculated in relation to the long-term inflation rate of the 
UK (2.38%) and at 2015 prices, prices will change by +13%, +3% and -16% in real value, 
respectively. 
Our modelling results warrant the following main conclusions: 
 unless wholesale power prices show permanent real price growth, the project 
will not pay off; its net present value is expected to be EUR -5.0 to -6.3 billion 
depending on the utilization rate. At the same time, this will present the company 
with major, additional equity financing needs (additional capital injections 
exceeding the amount of the prospective Russian loan - of EUR 12.4-18.6 billion - 
will be needed to keep the company operational). Until the early 2050s, the power 
plant company will only be able to remain operational via repeated capital 
injections.  In the first ten years of operations, the owner (the Hungarian 
taxpayers) will have to help out the nuclear power station by HUF 210-250 billion 
per annum on average, and in the subsequent decade by HUF 140-160 billion per 
annum on average; but even in the third decade of operations, the annual average 
capital injection amount will be HUF 41-75 billion;   
 to the extent that wholesale power prices develop by and large according to the 
forecast of the European Commission (in our model, they will increase in real 
value by 25% until 2026), the NPV will still be negative in relation to any of the 
capacity utilization rates (EUR -2.7 and -4.5 billion) and the owner will have to 
keep providing significant (EUR 6-10.5 billion) additional funding to keep the 
                                                          
4 EU (2014), p. 213. 
5 National Grid (2014).  
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facility operational. Repeated proprietary capital injections will be needed year 
on year until the mid-2040s to keep the project going. In the first ten years of 
operation, the owner (the Hungarian taxpayers) will have to help out the nuclear 
power station by HUF 140-190 billion per annum on average, and in the following 
decade by HUF 50-117 billion per annum on average; 
 to the extent that market power prices will be consistently higher by 50% over 
current ones in real terms, the project costs may be recovered at high utilization 
rates (net present value of between EUR -2.6 and -0.1 billion); yet the project 
would nevertheless need additional proprietary capital injections (of EUR 2.2 to 
5.6 billion) up until the mid-2030s. In the first ten years of operation, the owner 
will have to provide aid to the nuclear power station by HUF 68-133 billion per 
annum on average. In the second decade, the support will amount to HUF 0-43 
billion on an annual average; 
 ROI will be ensured, in line with the declarations of the government, if wholesale 
power prices are higher by 75% in real terms over current ones throughout the 
lifetime of the power plant, which would be operating with a utilization rate of 
min. 85% during this time period. 
The key findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows: 
1) Considering international power price forecasts, it is highly likely that the Paks-2 
New Power Plant would not be able to attain the sales prices required for 
independent market operations and would be permanently in need of State aid. 
We do not consider long-term real price growth by 75% - the rate needed for the 
independent market operation of the facility - a realistic option in the electricity 
market. Price increases on such a scale would provide a major stimulus to 
technological innovations in the field of other energy generation technologies 
and to energy efficiency, making the preservation of such a permanently high 
price unlikely. 
2) Market prices notwithstanding, the high-capacity operation of a nuclear power 
plant is becoming increasingly problematic due to the spread of renewable 
energies that limit the market options open to baseload operators due to the low 
variable costs of solar and wind energies. This problem will become particularly 
evident during the combined operations of the current and envisaged Paks units, 
when the share of nuclear energy may exceed 70% of domestic power 
generation.6 It would therefore be advisable to reduce the period of overlap to 
the minimum and to schedule the activation of any new power plant capacities 
for the mid-2030s. 
3) According to the forecast of the International Energy Agency, new innovations 
cutting investment and operating costs significantly (by 24-30% by 2035) are 
imminent also as regards nuclear technology.7 This circumstance underlines the 
fact that premature investment implies a risk of foregoing new innovations 
                                                          
6 According to the ENTSO-E database, the utilization rate of the French nuclear power plants characterized by a similarly 
high nuclear production ratio was only 73-76% in recent years. 
7 World Energy Investment Outlook, 2014 
5 
 
realized in other technologies, and also that countries taking a later decision on 
upgrading their nuclear capacities will be in a more favourable situation. 
4) Under the realistic power market scenarios, the power plant is likely to be 
continually in need of additional capital injections by the owner, and this will 
make State aid a fact. To prevent such support from being prohibited State aid, it 
would be commendable for the Hungarian government to acknowledge that the 
project does contain a State subvention, thus to initiate an authorization 
procedure for the European authorities.8 
5) The Hungarian government should alter its project communication strategy and 
present its calculations and arguments in favour of such an investment. Instead 
of stressing how cheap electricity generated by the nuclear power plant will be, it 
should tell the domestic and international public why, although power generated 
in the nuclear power plant will probably not be cheap, it still considers it 
important to carry out this project according to its current timetable.  
 
  
                                                          
8 Some government declarations note that the project does not comprise State aid if only because the Russian loan will be 
repaid by the central administration, and not the power plant; so the power plant will not be assuming any debt service 
obligations. In our opinion, this is obviously false. For if the state owner does not charge to the power plant its financing costs 
set out in the international contract, the market investor principle would clearly be impaired. Pursuant to Article 107 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, if a State agency provides investment, credit etc. to an undertaking, that 
amount will not be regarded as State aid if any private investor on the market would have acted similarly. It is hard to imagine a 
market investor that would not charge its own financing costs to the undertaking in which it has invested its money. Therefore, 
in our view, the project will contain no State aid only if the special project vehicle (SPV) is able to produce the costs of its own 
funding. This assumption is the starting point of our model. 
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3. EARLIER HUNGARIAN STUDIES ON THE TOPIC OF RETURN OF THE 
PAKS-2 PROJECT 
Several studies have been devoted to an analysis of the economics background of the 
new power plant to be built at Paks. In what follows, we will present three of these, and 
compare their respective economics approaches with our own analytical framework. 
Unfortunately, the papers available today include no official impact assessment by the 
Government that would explain what expectations make the pro-enlargement party say that 
“Hungary will make the best deal of the past forty years: the Paks investment and hence 
cheap electricity can make it the most competitive economy in Central Europe”9. The 
calculation supporting the following declaration of the former Minister for National 
Development would certainly be a matter of common interest: “According to calculations, 
power energy prices can be reduced by 13 per cent after capacity expansion - that is, the 
construction of the envisaged two nuclear power plant units in Paks.”10The model calculations 
concerned are currently unavailable, despite the promise made by the government in June 
2014 that the public at large will be given access to the scientific publications which 
demonstrate that enlargement of the Paks power plant is worthwhile for the country: “We‟ll 
present the figures that show the return on investment and guarantee cheap energy within 
Hungarian energy policy.”11 
More detailed analyses were published on the topic of the expected payoff from the 
project by Attila Aszódi, Government Commissioner in charge of the Paks enlargement 
project and his staff (Aszódi et al. 2014), the researchers of the Regional Centre for Energy 
Policy Research (REKK, 2013) and Balázs Romhányi, analyst from the Fiscal Responsibility 
Institute, Budapest (Romhányi, 2014). The main characteristics of the studies, as compared to 
the investigation criteria of the present study, are summed up in Table1. The three papers 
studied the economic issues related to the power plant in different depths and with different 
methodologies. The analysis of Aszódi et al. focused on the cost prices of production – i.e. 
determination of the minimum market price to be attained – while the REKK paper looked at 
determining the net present value of the project and Romhányi via an analysis of fiscal 
implications beyond those of direct benefit to investors. Despite their different opinions 
concerning the probability of the Paks project being financially viable, even the analysis 
drawn up by Government Commissioner Aszódi and his staff, clearly in favour of the project, 
highlight that the period of the repayment of the Russian loan will impose substantial 
burdens on the power plant company, which the SPV will be able to finance only at much 
higher market power prices than current ones. In the opinion of Attila Aszódi et al., power 
prices of HUF 28.74-35.56/kWh12, depending on the various scenarios, would have to be 
attained in the 21-year period of the repayment of the Russian loan taken out in relation to 
the investment, for the power plant to be able to cope without any further financial support. 
The authors firmly believe, on the other hand, that the project might be a good investment 
despite the above as, after repayment of the loan, the power plant would generate power at a 
price of HUF 8.05-11.09/kWh, which will result in a good average price over its entire lifetime. 
                                                          
9
  Press conference held by János Lázár, Head of the Prime Minister‟s Office, 16 January 2014. (Source: 
kormany-hu)  
10
 Paks press conference held by Minister for National Development Lászlóné Németh, 24 February 2014. 
(Source: fidesz.hu) 
11
 Statement of Minister Candidate János Lázár, Head of the Prime Minister‟s Office, 8 June 2014. (Source: 
kormany.hu, MTI) 
12
 Paks NPP achieved 12,88 HUF/kwh selling price in 2013. 
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They support their arguments with LCOE (levelized cost of electricity) calculations, yet they 
present sensitivity analyses for relatively few of the related input parameters (exchange 
rate; interest rate of own contribution; utilization factor; downpayment loan term).  
The methodology used by the authors concerned does not examine the project as such, 
i.e. it does not put it into the context of an active company, which makes it impossible to draw 
any conclusions from the study regarding the economic correlations underlying the averages 
calculated for its lifetime (such as the issue of funding, the central question of the present 
paper, for example). 
The most detailed study supported by a calculation appendix was done by the staff of 
the Regional Centre for Energy Policy Research in Autumn 2013, and it analyzed via detailed 
sensitivity analyses the expected return of creating a new nuclear power plant facility. Their 
analysis drew up three scenarios based on extensive international benchmark data, and they 
examined how changes in input factors (fuel costs, power price, the discount rate, operation 
costs, utilization, investment costs, investment term) would affect developments in the 
expected net present value of the project. They attached an excel model to the paper, which 
provides for an analysis of further scenarios. The decisive majority of the model applications 
by REKK produced negative net present values; the NPV in the reference scenario was 
negative, at HUF -110 billion. 
Romhányi examines primarily the fiscal impact of the power plant project. The author did 
not draw up any scenarios to study the direct, investor-level return as related to the project, 
and modelled the expected investment and operation expenditures and costs via an analysis 
of other papers and relevant data pertaining to the currently active Paks power plant. The 
paper drew up a detailed financial scenario for the prospective investment and analyzed the 
direct and indirect income flows relating to the investment and the operation time periods. It 
found that the power plant may produce a real return rate of 4% for investors at a power 
price of EUR 80-82 per MWh – that is, twice the currently-existing electricity prices. 
8 
 
Table 1 – Summary of the papers analyzing the economic effects of the Paks-2 NPP 
 REKK (2013) Aszódi et. al (2014) Romhányi (2014) Felsmann (2015) 
Primary focus of the 
economic calculations 
ROI analysis, scenario analysis Determination of the cost price of 
production 
Complex examination of the fiscal 
implications of the project 
Examination of the economic viability 
of the SPV 
Primary analytical 
methodology 
Project discounted cash flow (DCF-
based NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), 
levelized cost of energy (LCOE) 
Unit-cost-of-energy calculation 
(LCOE) 
Balance of payments to the central 
budget, internal rate of return (IRR) analysis 
at investor and at macro-level, respectively 
Net present value calculation based 
on indirect cash flow (FCFE) calculated from 
corporate level financial statements (DCF-
based NPV) 
Scenarios and a 
sensitivity analysis 
Three scenarios specified in detail; 
any number of versions can be tested in the 
attached excel model. 
The authors present some calculated 
unit costs of electricity (HUF/kWh) in a 
table, but they do not have as appendices 
any models. 
No project-level scenarios are 
analyzed.  The primary objective of the 
paper is to reveal the fiscal effects. 
Four detailed scenarios of capacity 
utilization and the development of prices. 
Three scenarios specified in detail; any 
number of versions can be studied in the 
attached excel model. 
Priority parameters for a 
sensitivity analysis 
Fuels costs; Power price; Discount 
rate; Operation costs; Utilization; 
Investment costs; Investment term. 
Exchange rate; Interest rate with own 
contribution; Utilization factor; 
Downpayment loan term. 
There is no scenario analysis in the 
classical sense; the analysis comprises an 
assessment of the power price and the 
return rate. 
Power price; Utilization factor; 
Interest burden on additional financing; Mid-
term maintenance rate; Working capital 
items; Depreciation rate 
Treatment of exchange 
rate effects 
Real price HUF model. A major part of 
input at the 2013 HUF rate. LCOE in 
EUR/MWh, converted at a fixed, 
parametrized rate. 
Real price HUF model at the 2014 
HUF rate. Sensitivity analysis calculated for 
three different exchange rates (300, 310, 
320 HUF/EUR). 
Current-price HUF model of the 
investment and cost items. 
Current-price EUR model. Treats 
long-term EUR inflation as a starter 
parameter. 
Referenced main 
external data sources, studies 
dealing with economic 
calculations 
MIT (2009), DECC (2011, 2012), IEA-
NEA (2010), ICEPT (2012), US EIA (2010), NEI 
(2013), Larsson (2012), VGB Powertech (2011), 
SKGS (2010), Elforsk (2011), NREL (2012), 
Fraunhofer (2012), JRC (2012). 
IEA Key World Energy Statistics 
(2013), D‟haeseleer (2013) 
EU (2014), IEA (2010) 
IEA (2012), NEI (2013), University of 
Chicago (2004), International Atomic Energy 
Agency (2013, 2014) 
EU (2014), IEA (2014), MIT(2015), US 
EIA (2015), National Grid (2014), 
REKK (2013), Romhányi (2014), Aszódi 
et al.(2014) 
Main conclusions 
regarding ROI 
Under a realistic scenario, the “power 
plant faces a cumulative discounted cash-
flow loss of around HUF 110 billion”. The unit 
cost of electricity being generated is 
LCOE=EUR 106 per MWh (IRR=8.7%), which 
may increase according to pessimistic 
assumptions up to EUR 176 per MWh, or 
decrease according to optimistic ones to 
EUR 66 per MWh. 
 
“In the first 21 years of operations, 
the average unit cost of electricity will be 
around HUF 30/kWh [around EUR 97/MWh 
at current rates] whereas the parameters 
being studied show a HUF +5/kWh and HUF -
1/kWh difference relative to that value... 
LCOE projected over the whole lifetime was 
HUF 16.01/kWh and HUF 16.38/kWh 
according to the two calculation methods. 
“From an investor perspective, at 
current power prices, the project will not pay 
off.” [The power price calculated at an 
investor level, at a 4% real rate of return, is 
EUR 80-82 per MWh.] 
“With measures affecting a broader 
number of citizens directly (consumption tax 
increase, cuts in social transfers in cash), the 
net growth sacrifice may be offset even at a 
price level of EUR 50-60/MWh, but the 
decline in government consumption would 
require power prices of almost EUR 80 and 
the exclusion of private investment of more 
than EUR 200/MWh. 
Should the wholesale power prices 
develop by and large according to the 
forecast of the European Commission 
(increase in real value by 25% by 2026), the 
ROI value would be negative at any of the 
capacity utilization rates (EUR -2.7 and -4.4 
billion) and the owner will have to keep 
providing significant (EUR 6-10.5 billion) 
additional funding to keep the facility going 
until the 2040s. 
For the project to pay off, wholesale 
power prices should undergo a stable 
increase of 75% at constant prices. 
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4. METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS 
The present paper adopts the shareholder value approach, which is common in the 
corporate finances field, and which determines the economic value of an investment by 
discounting the expected cash flows as related to the required capital expenditures.13 To 
calculate the present value, we prepared the financial statements forecast of the power 
plant company (profit and loss statement, and balance sheet) for the total investment period 
(2015-2025) and for the period of operations (2026-2085). The company‟s cash-flow 
statement was compiled indirectly, being on the basis of - and calculated from - data from 
the profit and loss statement and the balance sheet. To forecast the financial statements, we 
came up with several parameters that can be subjected to a sensitivity analysis. The paper 
presents scenarios primarily connected with the potential sales prices of the power plant and 
the ROI effect of expected capacity utilization rates, yet the calculation model in the paper‟s 
appendix makes it possible to analyze the effect of many other factors too (e.g. long-term 
inflation, interest rate, depreciation policy, working capital policy). 
Given the pattern of the accounting statements, the assets and liabilities recorded in the 
balance sheet must show an equilibrium year upon year. Where the value of the equity and 
liabilities is too low to finance the assets of the company, the necessary extra funding can be 
ensured by repeated capital injections by the owner (capital increase, supplementary 
payments) or by additional borrowing (short- or long-term credit extension). Whereas 
additional funding provided by the owner raises the invested capital and hence the capital 
value representing the basis of the expected return to owners, borrowing will have an 
immediate cost-raising effect on the company‟s business management as the interest costs 
will appear among financial expenditures, thereby reducing any pre-tax profit. Accordingly, 
there is a mutual connection between the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement of 
the company: the two statements will serve to influence each other. In a financial modelling, 
this problem can be treated by the gradual approach, by iteration. Such an iterative approach 
is used in the Excel model prepared as an appendix to the present paper; it calculates with 
the help of a built-in macro the rate of additional financing needed in any given year, while 
satisfying also the principle that the two sides of the balance sheet must attain equilibrium. 
The relevant legislation not only demands a balancing out of the assets and liabilities totals, 
but also that the equity of the company must not drop permanently below its subscribed 
capital.14 This law is dealt with in the financial model so that it automatically envisages an 
additional proprietary capital increase obligation should the value of the equity in the 
previous year be negative. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Rappaport (2002), p. 47. 
14 Under the Civil Code (Act V of 2013): “3:189 (1) The managing director shall without delay convene a members‟ meeting or 
initiate its decision-making process without having to hold a meeting in order to provide for the necessary measures whenever it 
comes to his attention that: a) the company‟s equity has dropped to half of the initial capital due to losses; b) the company‟s 
equity has dropped below the amount defined by law;... (2) In cases covered in Subsection (1), members are required to adopt 
decisions, in particular concerning subscription of supplementary capital contributions or on securing initial capital in other 
ways, should there be any reduction of the initial capital.” 
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4.1. Determination of the net present value in the model 
In line with the above, the proprietary cash flows of an active company are basically 
defined by three factors: 
1) The rate of the initial investment: in the calculation model this value is EUR 2.5 billion 
in all, which is the amount of own contribution to the investment project announced to 
have a total value of EUR 12.5 billion. Its schedule corresponds to that for the project‟s 
implementation. 
2) The necessary supplementary capital contributions of owners or supplementary 
capital allocations. Its rate is defined by whether the development of the equity of 
the company makes it necessary for the owner to provide supplementary capital to 
ensure operability in the accounting. 
3) Dividend paid out in the period of operation. 
The net present value of corporate cash flows can be defined in two ways by using data 
from the cash-flow statement. By discounting the value of the net cash-flow available to 
shareholders - i.e. the FCFE: the balance of cash flows from operations - the cash flows from 
investments and the cash flows from external financing. In this case, i.e. looking into 
shareholder cash flows, the discount factor will be based on the   , that is, the expected 
return on equity.  
The core equation for calculating the net present value this way is the following: 
    ∑
     
       
 
 
   
 
where  FCFE is the free cash flow to equity;     is the return expected by the 
shareholders in the tth year. 
The present value can also be calculated on the basis of the free cash flow for the firm 
(FCFF), i.e. the balance on cash flows before external financing (borrowing); but then the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) needs to be applied, which is to be calculated by the 
following formula: 
       
 
 
         
 
 
 
where E is equity, D is the stock of liabilities subject to interest (loans), V is the 
aggregate value of equity and loans, and    is the corporate tax rate. 
The calculation model in the paper‟s appendix determines the net present value by the 
first method, on the basis of free cash flow to equity. The discount factor is, accordingly, the 
expected return on equity. In the model, the value of    may be changed in the same way as 
that of any parameter. The summaries prepared for the model present outcomes at expected 
5%, 8% and 10% real rates of return, respectively. International papers commonly use 5% 
and 10% real rates of return on present value calculations when comparing returns on power 
plant technologies. 
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4.2. Real versus nominal model; the treatment of inflation and of the exchange 
rate 
There is a series of arguments in favour of both the real and the nominal value approach 
but, technically, the two methods give equivalent results provided that the model treats 
inflation appropriately. The use of nominal values is supported by the fact that interests on 
liabilities subject to interest payment and their repayment instalments are typically 
specified at current prices, as is the case also with the Russian financing of the present 
project.15 The annual debt service of the Russian loan to be drawn for the investment based 
on intergovernmental agreement is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 - Annual debt service on the EUR 10 billion Russian loan to be drawn for the Paks-2 NPP 
investment 
 
 
Since Russian financing is recorded in EUR and the long-term energy price prognoses are 
typically also available on a euro basis, it seemed sensible to use a current-price, EUR-based 
financial model. As for long-term inflation, a rate of 1.5% per annum was envisaged in line 
with the inflation projections of the European Central Bank, but this may be modified in the 
same way as with a model parameter. 
 
                                                          
15 The intergovernmental financing agreement (Act XXIV of 2014) gives a detailed specification of the repayment and 
interest conditions of the loan drawn in EUR, at nominal values. According to the agreement, the Russian party is to give a loan 
of max. EUR 10 billion for implementation of the investment, which may be used in 2014-2025; and this will serve to finance a 
maximum 80% of the total investment. Loan repayments will start following completion of the power plant, but no later than 15 
March 2026; and will last for 21 years, coming via two instalments a year. In the first seven years, 25%, in the second seven years 
35% and in the third seven years 40% of the loan amount will be due. The interest rate is 3.95% for the investment period, 4.5% 
in the first seven years of repayment, 4.8% in the second seven years and 4.95% in the third seven years. 
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5. INTRODUCING THE KEY MODEL PARAMETERS 
A key objective of the model is to provide for an analysis of financial risks that may 
adhere to the project - and their impact on shareholder value - by conducting sensitivity 
analyses. This objective, in turn, demands that key factors influencing value development be 
defined as parameters enabling the performance of extensive partial impact analyses. The 
model thus comprises a total of 20 parameters that can be altered to make simulations of 
expected returns and financial viability. 
5.1. Assumptions concerning the investment and the facility to be brought 
into existence as a result of the project 
5.1.1. Investment cost 
The present paper does not examine risks due to potential overruns of investment costs 
or to delays, yet it is nevertheless clear that any delay or cost overrun as related to the 
investment may have a most negative effect on the project‟s being worthwhile. According to 
our optimistic initial hypothesis concerning investment, the SPV will be able to complete the 
envisaged project at the planned EUR 12.5 billion cost, that is, at a specific investment cost of 
EUR 5200 per kW. This value can be seen as realistic based on international comparisons, and 
it corresponds by and large to the European data in the calculation appendix prepared for the 
2014 World Energy Investment Outlook publication of the International Energy Agency 
(Table2)16. 
Table 2 – Nuclear technology forecasts used in World Energy Outlook, 2014 for the New Policy 
(NPS) and the 450 PPM scenarios  
Data in 2012 USD 2012 2020 2035 2035/2012 
Progress 
Specific investment (NPS) $/kW 6600 6200 5000 24% 
Specific investment (450 PPM) 
$/kW 
6600 6200 4700 29% 
Specific O&M cost (NPS) $/kW 198 186 150 24% 
Specific O&M cost (450 PPM) $/kW 198 186 141 29% 
 
Although at first sight data from the International Energy Agency apparently confirms 
that Paks-2 NPP cannot be regarded as expensive compared to other similar facilities when 
knowing the relevant international data, the table actually highlights a new dimension for a 
serious – and as yet unanswered – problem regarding the Paks project. For Agency experts 
forecast a 24%-29% investment and operation cost reduction in relation to nuclear 
technology in the coming one-and-a-half decades, which means that Paks-2 NPP will probably 
be an expensive power plant and one that is more expensive to operate than nuclear power 
plants entering the market at that time. Many have criticized the 2014 decision on many 
                                                          
16 WEO publishes its data in US dollars (USD). The Energy Agency applies the EUR 0.78= USD 1 conversion rate for the 2012 
USD. 
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occasions for imposing an unreasonable burden on the domestic energy system in the 
envisaged period of “overlap” when, until the mid-2030s, the current and the new Paks power 
plants will be operating simultaneously, according to plans.  Parallel operation will require 
temporary investments (expansion of the powerline network, additional cooling) that will 
make the project more expensive and also complicate the market options as regards selling 
the surplus electricity. If, moreover, a nuclear power plant entering the market in the mid-
2030s is cheaper by one quarter and will be cheaper to operate by the same order of 
magnitude due to innovations taking place in applied nuclear technology meanwhile, this 
circumstance is yet another „input‟ into why Hungary should not commence any investments 
early to replace its existing nuclear power plant capacities. For early investment is likely to 
result in a relatively expensive and expensive-to-operate power plant that might exert a 
negative effect for more than half a century on Hungarian power generation costs - and, 
hence, on power prices payable by consumers. 
5.1.2. Timeframe of the investment 
In modelling the expected timeframe for the investment, we relied to a significant extent 
on the paper by Romhányi, who provided a detailed assessment of the expected timetable 
for work to be carried out via an analysis of international examples. The present study has as 
its base the timeframe specified by him, with two minor modifications. The modifications 
concern the data between 2015 and 2017 and in the period 2025-2026; while between 2018 and 
2024, we have made use of reference paper data. The two modifications are the following: 
1) Romhanyi indicates 2024 and 2026 as the date of completion for investment in the 
two units, which is in line with the expected technical roadmap. The present paper 
simplifies this, seeing 2025 as the completion date for both units. Consequently, no 
new investment value may be expected for 2026. (The reference paper puts 4.4% of 
the total investment into 2026.)  
2) The reference paper starts the investment in 2018, whereas investment expenditure 
will actually start earlier, according to the Budget Acts for 2015 and 2016. We thus 
posted 4.2% of the total investment to the period between 2015 and 2017. 
Figure 2 - Roadmap for envisaged investment 
 
In our calculation model, we have capitalized the investments in one sum, in 2026. On the 
balance sheet, within the tangible assets, 30% of investments is capitalized in relation to 
land and buildings, while 70% takes on board technical equipment, machinery and vehicles. 
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5.1.3. Operational life and renewal needed during the operation time period 
With regard to the planned operational life of the power plant, we have accepted the 
assumption of Aszódi et al. (2014), calculating with an operational life of sixty years. 
Accordingly, we modelled the operation of the power plant up until 2085. However, we 
dispute their assumption that no supplementary investments will be needed during the 
period of operations. In line with data from the international technical literature (Rogner, 
2012), we assumed a major mid-term overhaul during the period of operations, making its 
extent parameterizable. We set as the initial value of the parameter a supplementary, 
renovation-type investment affecting 30% of the value of machinery and equipment within 
the context of a mid-term overhaul.  The fact that new investments are needed also in the 
last third of the lifetime of an active power plant is well-illustrated by the time series 
occurring for the past five years of Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt. The power plant has made new 
investments of HUF 86 billion overall starting from 2010. 
Table 3 - New investment in the reference year at Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt., 2010-2015 (million 
HUF) 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
New investment in the reference year 17,892 21,559 16,420 17,260 13,226 
 
Figure 3 – Illustrative cash flow for the total lifecycle of a nuclear power station (source: 
International Nuclear Energy Agency, Rogner, 2012) 
 
 
5.1.4. Accounted-for depreciation 
The straight-line method was used for depreciation accounting. The depreciation base is 
the total investment amount, which is to be capitalized in 2026. Two depreciation rates were 
defined: an annual 2% for land, buildings, and an annual 4% for technical equipment and 
machinery. The depreciations rates can be modified within the model‟s parameters. 
Depreciation for new investments occurring as part of the mid-term overhaul was defined by 
using a depreciation rate of 4%. 
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5.2. Assumptions concerning the development of sales turnover 
The sales turnover of the power plant is influenced by two factors: the market price of 
electricity, and the capacity utilization rate of the power plant. We have defined parameters 
for both factors, and conducted sensitivity analyses relating to their different values. 
5.2.1. Expected development of power plant market prices 
Power generation is liberalized within the European Union: power plants develop their 
sales prices in competition with each other. Power generators are typically price-takers 
rather than price-setters; they have limited options to influence market prices. The present 
paper models this circumstance by defining two parameters: the market price rate and the 
capacity utilization rate of the power plant, both values being freely alterable in function of 
the expectations for the future. 
It is difficult to make a pre-estimation of the expected development of market prices 
over the planned sixty-year lifetime of the Paks power plant, but several forecasts have been 
released for the coming two decades. 
The European Commission study published in March 2014 calculates with a power market 
producer price increase of 2.4% p.a. between 2011 and 2020, and there will be a slight 
decrease for the time periods 2021-2030 and 2031-2050 (at -0.17% and -0.19%, 
respectively).17 This expected growth will lead to a 23% increase in the wholesale price of 
electricity for the period of the planned commissioning of the power plant, by 2026, which 
will moderate to less than 21% by the beginning of the 2030s at 2011 prices. 
According to the May 2015 analysis of the US government - which examines the 
scenarios for change-overs to the production of green energies - the real power price growth 
rates for households will be 5.7%-10.6% by 2020 and 11.4-16.3% by 2030, according to the 
scenarios modelling various production structures. The same figures for industrial 
consumers are 5.8-11.6% until 2020 and 11.5-17.3% overall until 2030.18 
Figure 4 – Average consumer power prices under the various Clean Power Plan scenarios, from 
2005 to 2040. (Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2015) 
 
                                                          
17 EU(2014), p. 213. 
18 US. EIA (2015). The percentage rates referred to above are percentage values calculated from the table on p.23. of the 
paper. 
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According to the June 2014 forecast of the British system operator National Grid, 
baseload power wholesale prices are expected to increase in the UK market by -16% to +13% 
in real terms by 2026, whereas by 2035, a real price decline relative to 2015 will be from 4% 
to 38%. Table 4 shows the market price forecasts of the paper for 2026 and 2035, 
respectively.19 
Table 4 - Expected baseload wholesale prices in the UK market, 2015-2035. (Based on National 
Grid data, calculated with a 2.38% long-term UK inflation rate.) 
£/MWh 
Current prices 
Real prices (P2015=100%) , 2.38% 
inflation rate 
2015 2026 2035 2026 Δ2026/2015 2035 Δ2035/2015 
High price 66.0 96.1 101.6 74.2 13% 63.5 -4% 
Base case  54.5 76.0 77.1 56.1 3% 44.4 -19% 
Low price 46.9 54.2 52.1 39.5 -16% 29.3 -38% 
 
In summary here, the values indicated in the three papers show that forecasts for the 
wholesale power prices expected in the mid-2020s are spread over a wide range, from -16% 
to +26%. To define the initial value of the price growth parameter (real price growth of 25% 
to 2026, a price change corresponding to the generate inflation rate afterwards), the present 
paper started out from the EU 2014 forecast, but did utilize a somewhat more favourable 
premise for the power plant than the three aforementioned papers based on the assumption 
that power prices will not go down in real value from 2026 onwards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 The data series of the National Grid (2014) paper is downloadable also in excel format from the 
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/UK/Industry-information/Future-of-Energy/Future-Energy-Scenarios/ website. The data series 
comprises current price values that we have adjusted to relate to constant prices by using the 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/forecast long-term inflation forecasts for the 2020s. 
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Table 5 - Long-term power market forecasts (EU; US EIA, National Grid) 
European 
Commission (2014) 
The costs of power generation will increase by 2.4% p.a. at 
constant prices until 2020, and decrease by -0.17% p.a. in 2021-2030 
and by -0.19% p.a. in 2031-2040. This means price growth of 23% by 
2026, which will lessen to 21% by 2030. 
National Grid, 
UK (2014) 
Current-price forecast for the development of UK wholesale 
power prices. It comprises three scenarios (high, average and low 
prices). The wholesale UK power price forecast up to 2026 is 96.1, 76 
and 54.2 £/MWh, respectively, implying +13%, +3% and -16% price 
change at 2015 prices calculated in line with the long-term UK inflation 
rate (2.38%). 
US Energy 
Information 
Administration, 
2015) 
Constant-price forecast at 2013 prices for 2020, 2030 and 2040: 
expected development of household and industrial consumer power 
prices at four different power plant production facilities. Real price 
change of 11.6% by 2020 and 16% by 2030 compared to 2013 prices.  
Current 
study‟s  model 
assumptions 
Four scenarios (others can be modelled by altering the 
parameters) 
a) no real price change  
b) 25% real price growth by 2026  
c) 50% real price growth by 2026  
d) 75% real price growth by 2026 
 
Since the development of wholesale prices is considered a key parameter, the relevant 
model calculations were made in relation to four different scenarios. The four scenarios: 
a) The wholesale (market) prices realized by the power plant 20 do not increase in real 
terms (the Paks nuclear power plant can bring about wholesale power prices of EUR 
51 per MWh in 2026 and EUR 58 per MWh in 2035 at current prices). 
b) The wholesale (market) prices realized by the power plant increase in real terms by 
25% (the Paks nuclear power plant can bring about wholesale power prices of EUR 64 
per MWh in 2026 and EUR 73 per MWh in 2035 at current prices). 
c) The wholesale (market) prices realized by the power plant increase in real terms by 
50% (the Paks nuclear power plant can bring about wholesale power prices of EUR 77 
per MWh in 2026 and EUR 88 per MWh in 2035 at current prices). 
                                                          
20 The 2013 net output of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant was 14.4 TWh according to the MAVIR statistical yearbook. This 
means a specific power price of HUF 12.88 per kWh, i.e. a sales price of EUR 43.39 per MWh at the exchange rate of 2013. 
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d) The wholesale (market) prices realized by the power plant increase in real terms by 
75% (the Paks nuclear power plant can bring about wholesale power prices of EUR 89 
per MWh in 2026 and EUR 102 per MWh in 2035 at current prices). 
5.2.2. Capacity utilization during operation 
Capacity utilization is defined essentially by a combination of technical characteristics 
and market opportunities. The objective for baseload generating facilities is to achieve the 
highest possible utilization rate, in excess of 90% on an annual average if possible. The 
model defines the expected capacity utilization rates by separate parameters for the time 
period 2026 to 2034, when the new units will be operating together with the existing ones,21 
and for the time period after 2034. Using two different time periods is justified by the fact 
that, in the period of the combined operations of the existing and the new Paks units, the 
contribution of domestic nuclear generation to the energy balance will probably be the 
highest globally. The utilization rate of the French nuclear power plants characterized by a 
similarly high nuclear output ratio (70%+) was 73-76% in recent years, suggesting that it is 
advisable to calculate also with more pessimistic utilization rates for high nuclear 
contributions as the sales possibilities for an excessive amount of baseload energy may be 
temporarily limited. 
Table 6 - Output and capacity utilization rates for French nuclear power plants, 2010-2013 
(Calculation based on the ENTSO-E database) 
France 
Nuclear 
output 
(MWh) 
Installed 
nuclear 
capacity 
(MW) 
Nuclear 
capacity 
utilization 
rate (%) 
Nuclear 
contribution 
to power 
generation 
(%) 
2010 407,877 63,130 73.75% 74.12% 
2011 421,118 63,130 76.15% 77.56% 
2012 404,882 63,130 73.21% 74.78% 
2013 403,703 63,130 73.00% 73.29% 
 
We defined four scenarios also for capacity utilization: 
a) permanently low utilization (75% for the entire operating period); 
b) average utilization (85% for the entire operating period); 
c) average utilization (85%) in the years of the parallel operation of the old and new 
units, then high (92%) utilization (base case scenario set out in the model); 
d) permanently high utilization (92% for the entire operating period). 
                                                          
21 As a matter of fact, the existing power plant units will be decommissioned gradually from 2032 to 2037 according to the 
lifetime extension plans. The 2034 threshold value of the model simplifies somewhat this decommissioning process. 
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In our opinion, there are professional arguments in favour of each and every scenario. 
Permanently low utilization is conceivable if stable demand for baseload energy keeps 
decreasing due to the further spread of renewable energies. There has already been a period, 
in 2014, when 74% of the demand of the total German energy system was satisfied by 
renewable resources. The 2014 forecast of the German Öko-Institut puts the number of hours 
within a year when power prices will drop practically to zero due to the satisfaction of the 
total demand by producers using renewable bases at as many as 2700 hours in 2035 and 3700 
in 2045.22 
The argument in favour of high utilization is that baseload generators will have their 
place to some extent in the long term, too, within an integrated European market. Thus, an 
investment already undertaken may produce permanently high utilization rates due to its 
relatively low variable costs (while the market price associated with high utilization is a 
different issue). 
5.3. Development of operating costs 
We relied partly on technical literature data and partly on fact data relating to the 
current Paks power plant to make a plan of likely operating costs for the power plant 
company. Special attention is given among costs to fuel costs, personnel expenses and costs 
associated with the future decommissioning of the power plant, and also to waste storage 
costs. 
5.3.1. Fact costs for Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt. 
In Appendix 1, we give a detailed overview of the development of the expenses and 
turnover of Paks Nuclear Power Plant from 2003 to 2014 based on the annual reports of the 
company. Figure 5 shows the development of principal expense items and trade results for 
the past decade. 
Figure 5 – Trade results (EBIT) and main expenses by cost type for Paksi Atomerűmű Zrt., 2003-
2014 
 
                                                          
22Based on the presentation held by Felix Matthes on 17 April 2014 in Budapest. 
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As is obvious from the data series that the power plant‟s operations are affected by four 
main expense factors. In the category of material-type charges, the costs of nuclear fuel 
excel. Other expenses include payments by the power plant to the Central Nuclear Financial 
Fund (CNFF) to finance its waste management and also prospective dismantling operations. 
Table 7 – Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt. fuel expenses and payments to CNFF, 2010-2014 
data in million HUF 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Nuclear fuel expense 12,934 14,623 16,240 18,292 20,498 
Payment to the Central Nuclear 
Financial Fund 23,127 23,127 19,329 19,329 21,294 
 
5.3.2. Modelling of fuels expenses 
To determine fuel costs, we started out from the fact costs pertaining to nuclear fuel 
used by the current power plant, noting actual capacity values as defined by the utilization 
rate and by the plant size of the new power plant. 
5.3.3. Other material cost and charges 
Other raw materials and consumables and material charges were defined on the basis of 
values laid out in the 2013 report of Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt. External charges incurred by Paksi 
Atomerőmű Zrt. regularly amounted to HUF 32 to 35 billion in the past five years. We used 
the lowest fact values - data for 2013 - as starting values for the model calculations. The 
value of external charges was also determined on the basis of 2013 data (HUF 3 billion). The 
starting data was converted to EUR at the 2013 exchange rate and increased according to the 
long-term inflation rate. This methodology assumes that the expense items concerned can be 
regarded as fixed ones and will not increase because of the larger plant size of the new power 
plant, i.e. they would result in cost levels that are 20% lower than the current one‟s given an 
identical utilization rate. 
5.3.4. Personnel costs 
Personnel costs were defined via the same method as above in relation to material 
charges. To determine the base value, we took into account 2013 fact wage costs and 
payments to personnel, converted those into EUR and then raised them in line with the 
inflation rate. We assumed that the final headcount would be attained gradually over the 
investment period, in the years preceding commissioning. Higher values indicated for 2024-
2025 are explained by the fact that a significant part of the necessary staff will probably 
have to be available already for the period of training and for the test run. 
Table 8 – Envisaged personnel costs in the investment period 2021-2026 
(million euros) 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 
Personnel costs 3 3 15 38 77 130 
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5.3.5. Other charges and taxes payable 
In the other charges line, we took into account domestic business tax and payments to 
the Central Nuclear Financial Fund. The local business tax was calculated in relation to the 
sales revenue adjusted for material costs, at a 2% rate. 
As for CNFF payments, the starting parameter value of the model is EUR 6 per MWh. 
Calculated on the basis of sales data, in 2013 the power plant paid a unit EUR 4.5/MWh. The 
increase here is warranted by the fact that at current payment levels, Nuclear Fund resources 
would probably not provide full-scale cover for the costs related to waste management and 
decommissioning.23 
In terms of taxation, the model exclusively takes into account a corporate tax rate fixed 
at 16%. The value being set is freely modifiable as a parameter. Although, to date, the power 
plant pays other industry-specific special taxes comparable in order of magnitude to the 
corporate tax - or exceeding it - we did begin with the assumption that it is not advisable to 
include such special tax items in any ROI calculation in a modelling period of 70 years. 
5.4. Financing 
The model was drawn up based on the initial assumption that, normally, the owner would 
only provide a EUR 2.5 billion equity financing, corresponding to 20% of the planned 
investment. We considered this equity financing – as in the case of the Russian loan – fixed, 
and treated it separately from the other financing considerations affecting the firm. In the 
model, equity financing increases the subscribed capital of the company, and the owner will 
transfer this resource to the company according to the investment schedule. The financing 
costs for the Russian loan were laid out in the model in line with the fact values from 
accessible official documents. 
If, during operations, the company lands in a situation where it loses its total equity, 
then, in line with civil law rules, the company owner will be obliged to restore the equity 
situation, as we have indicated in the balance sheet related to the restricted reserves. 
The company will pay a dividend to shareholders if its profit after taxes is positive and 
the equity exceeds the subscribed capital. The dividend rate can be parameterized: a 
dividend rate corresponding to 80% of the profit for any given year was defined. 
5.4.1. Resources subject to interest 
Where the equity situation of the company makes it possible, any supplementary 
financing needs incurred during the given year will be covered via the drawing of short-term 
(bridging) loans. The rate of interest on such loans will be parameterizable. The base value is 
set at 8%. 
Any accumulation of financial instruments at the company is treated by the model on the 
assets side of the balance sheet, in the “Securities” column. The company will have interest 
income on the securities, the rate of which can also be set as a parameter (starting value: 
4%).   
                                                          
23Aszódi et al. (2014) envisage HUF 2/kWh in their paper, which is more or less identical with our modelled value at the 
current exchange rate. 
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5.4.2. Working capital policy 
The working capital policy of the company was determined by defining certain premises 
in relation to accounts receivable, the investment and other accounts payable. Any working-
capital-related assumption can be modified freely in line with the parameters of the model. 
The rotation time for accounts receivable was defined at 30 days, similarly to that for 
the accounts payable. For the latter item, material and other charges were taken into account 
as a projection base. For the investment accounts payable, a rotation time of 90 days - which 
is more favourable for the power plant company - was taken into account. For a determining 
of other accounts payable, the projection base came from personnel expenses and the 
general turnover tax position of the company.  
 
6. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
As emphasized already in the introductory section of this paper, the primary objective of 
drawing up a financial model was to examine how realistic the government declarations are 
when expecting that the Paks-2 NPP project will be financially viable on its own, i.e. without 
needing any additional capital support. This is why, in addition to determining the net present 
value, we examined whether realization of any given scenario implied a periodic or final 
supplementary financing on behalf of the owner. 
6.1. ROI and supplementary financing needs in specific modelled scenarios 
Table 8 gives a summary of the model results for the scenarios presented earlier. The 
table shows the net present value for a given scenario at a real rate of discount of 5%. Where 
the 5% discount rate led to a positive NPV, return on investment calculated with a discount 
factor of 10% is also shown. In the table, the Tmax value of the given scenario indicates the 
supplementary equity financing that will need to be satisfied by the owner of the company in 
addition to the originally envisaged EUR 2.5 billion for the power plant company to keep it 
operational. The Hmax value is the maximum supplementary borrowing amount - that is, the 
value of what is to be borrowed by the company in addition to the Russian loan from external 
creditors (or from the owner) under a given scenario. In the table, the background of the cells 
for scenarios implying negative NPV and a significant supplementary financing requirement 
for shareholders is coloured red, whereas a green background refers to the scenarios under 
which their terms of implementation for the project may be reasonable. 
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Table 9 - NPV, supplementary equity financing and borrowing requirement for the Paks-2 NPP 
company based on the capacity utilization in relation to the wholesale power price 
 No growth in the 
real price of 
energy 
In 2026:  
EUR 51/MWh 
In 2035:  
EUR 58/MWh  
25% real energy 
price growth 
In 2026:  
EUR 64/MWh 
In 2035:  
EUR 73/MWh 
50% real energy 
price growth 
In 2026:  
EUR 77/MWh 
In 2035:  
EUR 88/MWh 
75% real energy 
price growth 
In 2026:  
EUR 89/MWh 
In 2035:  
EUR 102/MWh 
Permanently low 
utilization (75%) 
NPV5%= 
EUR -6323 m 
Tmax: EUR 18,623 
m 
Hmax: EUR 5,635 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR -4,451 m 
Tmax: EUR 10,576 
m 
Hmax: EUR 4,168 m 
NPV5%= 
EUR -2563 m 
Tmax: EUR 5627 m 
Hmax: EUR 3,481 m 
NPV5%= 
EUR -377 m 
Tmax: EUR 2509 m 
Hmax: EUR 3083 m 
Average 
utilization (85%) 
NPV5%= 
EUR -5581m 
Tmax: EUR 14137 m 
Hmax: EUR 4,990 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR -3487 m 
Tmax: EUR 7748 m 
Hmax: EUR 3,616 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR -1139 m 
Tmax: EUR 3338 m 
Hmax: EUR 3093 m 
NPV5%= 
EUR 1606 m 
NPV10%=  
EUR -1269 m 
Tmax: EUR 1216 m 
Hmax: EUR 3093 m 
Average 
utilization rate 
until 2034 (85%), 
then high 
utilization (92%) 
(Base Case 
scenario) 
NPV5%=  
EUR -5210 m 
Tmax: EUR 12846 m 
Hmax: EUR 4,623 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR -2976 m 
Tmax: EUR 6606 m 
Hmax: EUR 3542 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR -952 m 
Tmax: EUR 2966 m 
Hmax: EUR 3093 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR 2643 m 
NPV10%=  
EUR -1102 m 
Tmax: EUR 1216 m 
Hmax: EUR 3093 m 
Permanently high 
rate of utilization 
(92%) 
NPV5%=  
EUR -5042 m 
Tmax: EUR 12404 m 
Hmax: EUR 4623 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR -2751 m 
Tmax: EUR 6014 m 
Hmax: EUR 3542 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR -61 m 
Tmax: EUR 2224 m 
Hmax: EUR 3101 m 
NPV5%=  
EUR 3101 m 
NPV10%=  
EUR -941 m 
Tmax: EUR 822 m 
Hmax: EUR 3101 m 
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As can be seen on the basis of the data in the table,  
 unless wholesale power prices show permanent real price growth, the project 
costs will not be recovered; its net present value is expected to be EUR -5.0 to -
6.3 billion depending on the utilization rate. In addition, this will present the 
company with major additional equity financing needs (an additional capital 
injection exceeding the amount of the Russian loan to be drawn - of EUR 12.4-18.6 
billion - will be needed to keep the company operational). Regular capital 
injections will be required to keep the power plant company operational until the 
early 2050s;   
 if wholesale power prices develop more or less according to European 
Commission forecasts, the NPV value will still be negative at any of the assumed 
capacity utilization rates (EUR -2.7 and -4.4 billion) and the owner will have to 
keep providing significant (EUR 6-10.5 billion) additional funding to keep the 
facility operational. Repeated equity capital injections will be needed year on 
year until the mid-2040s to keep the project alive; 
 if market power prices are to be permanently higher by 50% than current ones, 
the project costs might be recovered at a high utilization rate (NPV between EUR 
-2.5 and -0.06 billion), yet the project would nonetheless need additional equity 
capital injections (of EUR 2.2 to 5.6 billion) up until the mid-2030s; 
 ROI will be ensured (which is in line with government declarations) if wholesale 
power prices are higher by 75% in real terms than current ones throughout the 
lifetime of the power plant24, and it would operate at a utilization rate of min. 
85%. Here, the owner would have to assist the operations of the power plant with 
capital replacements only for minimum and short bridging periods. 
Although expectations for the future are dispersed over a broad domain, it is obvious 
that any return on the power plant investment is conceivable only if given such high power 
prices as exceed significantly the forecasts of the relevant international organizations. Given 
the likely future development of the electricity prices, the state owner of the company will 
probably be obliged to provide the company with significant support even after its 
commissioning to be able to meet the financial obligations deriving from debt service for the 
Russian loan. 
6.2. Detailed analysis of the Base Case scenario 
Any number of scenarios can be analyzed on the basis of the calculation model, based on 
the chosen values of the 20 parameters. Appendices 2-5 present model results for four 
different power price forecasts, at a 85% capacity utilization until 2033, and 92% 
afterwards. In what follows, we analyze the so-called Base Case scenario assuming a 25% 
real price growth for electricity until 2026. The parameters of the Base Case scenario are 
summed up in Table 10. 
                                                          
24 Permanent power price growth on this scale would probably give a strong boost to innovations in alternative power 
generation - which phenomena makes the persistence of high prices over a 60-year time horizon rather uncertain. Moreover, one 
wonders what government statements forecasting a 13% price reduction upon realization of the Paks-2 NPP project refer to if 
the basis for these are claims that the company will not need any additional capital support on lasting high wholesale power 
market price expectations. 
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Table 10 - Parameter values of the model in the Base Case scenario 
Parameters used to run the model  
                  
Planned capacity 
utilization during the 
lifetime of Paks-1 85%   
Dividend ratio 
based on yearly 
after tax profit 80%   
Working 
capital 
components     
Planned capacity 
utilization after the 
decommissioning of 
Paks-1 92%   
Corporate tax 
rate 16%   
Accounts 
receivable 30 day 
Power price growth 
at real prices until 
2026 25%   
Local business 
tax 2%   Inventories 1 year (nuclear fuel) 
Inflation rate (euro 
zone) 1.5%   
Depreciation 
rate of real 
property 2%   
Investment 
accounts 
payable 90 day 
Interest rate of short 
term (bridging) loans 8%   
Depreciation of 
machinery and 
equipment 4%   
Other accounts 
payable 30 day 
Interest rate on 
securities  4%   
Mid-term 
overhaul, 
concerning 30% 
of 
equipment 
Other liabilities 1 monthly personnel 
cost + VAT position 
      
Payment to 
CNFF 
(EUR/MWh) 6.0 EUR/MWh VAT 27%   
 
We have compared the modelled cost data with the fact data of Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt. to 
see whether the chosen parameter values result in a realistic costs structure. Table 11 
summarizes the operation indices calculated on the basis of the annual reports of Paksi 
Atomerőmű Zrt., and compares them to the values coming from the model‟s application. 
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Table 11 - average fact values generated from some operation indicators of Paksi Atomerőmű 
Zrt. compared to values calculated from the data of the modelled Base Case scenario 
  
Paks-1 
Fact 
2003-
2014 
Paks-1 
Fact 
2008-
2014 
Paks-2 
First 30 
years 
2026-
2055 
Paks-2 
Second 
30 years 
2056-
2085 
EBIT/Sales 10.9% 17.2% 22.31% 41.89% 
EBITDA/Sales 23.8% 28.7% 50.45% 51.05% 
Personnel cost ratio 19.2% 18.0% 12.08% 11.82% 
Material cost ratio 35.9% 35.3% 24.21% 23.87% 
Ratio of other expenditures 25.6% 21.2% 13.27% 13.26% 
 
As can be seen, significant efficiency improvement was assumed for each of the decisive 
cost items in the Base Case scenario relative to the operating costs of the nuclear power 
plant in operation at present. Consequently, the unfavourable return (NPV5%= EUR -2.97 
billion) data is attributable to the financing burdens related to the project, and not to over-
budgeted costs. 
Figure 6 depicts the development of the equity and supplementary creditor financing 
positions during the operations of the power plant. The band highlighted in blue shows the 
accumulated cash-flow generated by the project for the owners. The capital increases for 
shareholders (EUR 2.5 billion going to the subscribed capital, according to the Russian-
Hungarian agreement, and the part exceeding that to the earmarked capital) will impose 
continual annual obligations on the owner up until 2046. The capital injections will peak in 
2046 at EUR 9106 million. The company will be able to pay out a dividend for the first time in 
2056, so equity funding will already be going down in the second part of the lifetime of the 
facility. In addition to capital replacement by the owner, the company will be in need of 
additional borrowing that will peak in 2046 at EUR 3.54 billion. 
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Figure 6 – Development of equity financing and accumulated net present value in the Base Case 
scenario 
 
 
The right-hand axis in the figure shows the chronological development of net present 
value calculated on the basis of annual cash flows. As can be seen, the positive cash-flows of 
the second part of the operating lifetime can only partly offset the negative annual cash-
flows of the initial investments and financing burdens, the NPV remains negative, and its 
value is EUR -3262 million up to termination of operations, improving to EUR -2976 million by 
the present value of the securities (EUR 286 million) at the end of the operation period. 
Figure 7 makes it even more obvious that the operation of the power plant under the 
currently known financing conditions will imply inter-generational income transfer. It is clear 
from the data that the Hungarian State as owner – hence, indirectly, the community of 
taxpayers – will be obliged to provide continuous capital replacement to the power plant 
company until 2046 in order to be able to realize positive cash-flows from the second half of 
the 2050s onwards – which will nevertheless still not mean a positive overall return of the 
project.  
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Figure 7 - Equity cash-flow and additional debt financing under the Base Case scenario 
 
 
The positive cash-flow starting from the second half of the 2050s will, however, be no 
more than a promise unless power price growth in real terms occurs and exceeds the inflation 
rate in the decades to come. If not, the power plant would need new rounds of equity 
financing until the early 2050s, and the project would produce a positive cash-flow for the 
first time 42 years after starting operations according to the expectations. 
 
Figure 8 - Equity cash-flow and additional debt financing under the “No permanent power price 
increase” scenario 
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7. SUMMARY 
Our primary objective in writing this paper was to highlight the question marks 
concerning the financing of the new power plant units planned for Paks. Hopefully, our 
calculation model will provide a good basis for commencing a discussion of merit on whether 
it is realistic to assume that Paks-2 NPP will be able to function autonomously, i.e. without 
additional State aid, under given market conditions. In our opinion, the currently known long-
term power price forecasts do not support the growth of the wholesale prices of electricity 
to the extent that would be necessary for the self-sustaining operations of Paks-2 NPP. The 
power plant is likely to be permanently in need of top-ups provided by the owner – and, 
indirectly, the taxpayer. The need for continuous capital injections probably for decades to 
come suggests that the power plant will only be able to sustain its operations with State aid, 
and this warrants closer examination of this aid pursuant to Articles 107(1) and 108(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.25 
In our opinion, it is advisable for the Hungarian government (as in the case of the UK 
government) to change its current position that the project will not involve any State aid 
given the fact that under most of the scenarios modelled by us, the autonomous, market-
based operations of the power plant cannot be ensured. If the Hungarian government 
considers the aid compatible with European regulations, it should initiate a notification 
procedure ASAP to have such aid approved by the European Commission. The procedure 
would make it possible to learn the opinion of every stakeholder in a transparent form, and 
this would help the parties settle the issue of planned State aid to the Paks-2 NPP project in 
a reassuring way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25 Under Article 107(1): “Except as otherwise provided for in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or 
the production of specific goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market.” Article 108(1) rules on the co-operation of the Commission and the Member States: “The Commission shall, in 
cooperation with Member States, keep under constant review all systems of aid existing in those States. It shall propose to the 
latter any appropriate measures required for progressive development or for the functioning of the internal market.”  
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Appendix 1 - Fact data for Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt., 2003-2014 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total sales (revenues) (01+02) 84 073 95 853 110 318 112 383 133 489 144 274 156 984 167 867 174 616 184 243 185 528 172 878
Own performance capitalized (+03+04) 1 295 946 923 777 640 696 260 547 1 019 753 541 533
Other income 11 007 4 594 2 455 3 757 5 586 4 066 2 343 3 757 10 582 5 004 3 442 4 011
   including: loss in value marked back 19
Raw materials and consumables 13 556 15 868 18 190 17 326 18 661 19 064 20 617 21 989 24 684 25 497 27 128 29 145
Contracted services 15 837 17 140 20 197 22 301 23 302 28 378 29 958 33 732 35 146 33 933 32 653 34 154
Other service activities 2 028 2 279 2 356 3 599 2 310 2 363 2 436 2 448 2 456 2 896 3 000 3 049
Original cost of goods sold 68 42 48 61 78 149 66 72 324 291 34 40
Value of services sold (intermediated) 44 104 231 340 607 588 450 93 85 280 415 641
Material costs (05+06+07+08+09) 31 533 35 433 41 022 43 627 44 958 50 542 53 527 58 334 62 695 62 897 63 230 67 029
Wages and salaries 11 403 12 294 13 332 14 411 15 457 14 925 15 344 16 823 17 862 18 703 19 052 19 502
Other employee benefits 2 953 3 479 4 134 4 274 5 015 4 915 4 997 6 144 5 860 5 345 5 280 5 576
Contributions on wages and salaries 4 188 4 608 5 115 5 328 5 754 5 756 5 776 8 020 7 654 8 419 8 557 8 809
Staff costs (10+11+12) 18 544 20 381 22 581 24 013 26 226 25 596 26 117 30 987 31 376 32 467 32 889 33 887
Depreciation 17 268 17 617 14 269 14 248 13 994 14 107 16 015 18 164 21 754 24 114 20 398 22 825
Other operating charges 32 786 28 787 31 448 30 540 44 682 37 367 36 768 37 559 40 945 30 337 32 889 33 456
including: loss in value 875 357 1 815 757 3 783 2 672 416 604 680 171 202 192
Income from operations (I+II+III-IV-V-VI-VII) -3 756 -825 4 376 4 489 9 855 21 424 27 160 27 127 29 447 40 185 40 105 20 225
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
New investment in the reference year 17 892 21 559 16 420 17 260 13 226
Nuclear fuel cost 12 934 14 623 16 240 18 292 20 498
Payments into CNFF 23 127 23 127 19 329 19 329 21 294
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Mean
2003-2014
Mean
2008-2014
EBIT/Sales -4,5% -0,9% 4,0% 4,0% 7,4% 14,8% 17,3% 16,2% 16,9% 21,8% 21,6% 11,7% 10,9% 17,2%
EBITDA/Sales 16,1% 17,5% 16,9% 16,7% 17,9% 24,6% 27,5% 27,0% 29,3% 34,9% 32,6% 24,9% 23,8% 28,7%
Personnel cost ratio 22,1% 21,3% 20,5% 21,4% 19,6% 17,7% 16,6% 18,5% 18,0% 17,6% 17,7% 19,6% 19,2% 18,0%
Material cost ratio 37,5% 37,0% 37,2% 38,8% 33,7% 35,0% 34,1% 34,8% 35,9% 34,1% 34,1% 38,8% 35,9% 35,3%
Ratio of other expenditures 39,0% 30,0% 28,5% 27,2% 33,5% 25,9% 23,4% 22,4% 23,4% 16,5% 17,7% 19,4% 25,6% 21,2%
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Appendix 2 - Model application results without assuming power price growth in real terms 
 
  
Parameters of the current run of the model Paks-1 Fact
2008-2014 2026-2055 2056-2085
Planned capacity util ization during the lifetime of Paks-1 85% Dividend ratio based on yearly after tax profit 80% Working capital items EBIT/Sales 17,2% 3,39% 27,87%
Planned capacity util ization after the decommissioning of Paks-1 92% Corporate tax rate 16% Accounts receivables 30 days EBITDA/Sales 28,7% 38,57% 39,31%
Power price growth at real prices until  2026 0% Local business tax 2% Inventories 1 year (nuclear fuel) Personnel cost ratio 18,0% 15,10% 14,77%
Inflation rate (euro zone) 1,5% Depreciation rate of real property 2% Investment accounts payable 90 days Material cost ratio 35,3% 30,26% 29,84%
Interest rate of short-term (bridging) loans 8% Depreciation of machinery and equipment 4% Accounts payable 30 days Ratio of other expenditures 21,2% 16,08% 16,07%
Interest rate on securities 4% Mid-term overhaul, concerning 30% of equipment Other l iabilities 1 monthly personnel cost + VAT position
Payment to CNFF (EUR/MWh) 6,0 EUR/MWh VAT 27%
Model results: NPV (in million euro)
Subsribed (registered) capital (2025) 2 500 Investment 2026-2035  2036-2045 2046-2055
NPV  r=5% in real terms (explicite  period) -5 365 mEUR Maximum of additional capital injections 12 846 94 198 225 012 141 736 41 611
NPV with residual value (r=5%) -5 210 mEUR Maximum of additional loans 4 623
Overall 19 969
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Development of the equity financing position and the NPV at 5% discount rate 
Cumulated capital increase/dividend Cumulated bridging loan from owner Cumulated present value of CF to equity r=5%  (right axis)
The left axis shows the  capital and loan financing of the Hungarian party of the project in current prices. The right axis 
demonstates the accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
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accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
*Value is negative if the company requires additional loans to operation, positive in case of repayment the earlier loans.
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Appendix 3 - Model application results assuming a 25% power price growth in real terms 
 
  
Parameters of the current run of the model Paks-1 Fact
2008-2014 2026-2055 2056-2085
Planned capacity util ization during the lifetime of Paks-1 85% Dividend ratio based on yearly after tax profit 80% Working capital items EBIT/Sales 17,2% 22,31% 41,89%
Planned capacity util ization after the decommissioning of Paks-1 92% Corporate tax rate 16% Accounts receivables 30 days EBITDA/Sales 28,7% 50,45% 51,05%
Power price growth at real prices until  2026 25% Local business tax 2% Inventories 1 year (nuclear fuel) Personnel cost ratio 18,0% 12,08% 11,82%
Inflation rate (euro zone) 1,5% Depreciation rate of real property 2% Investment accounts payable 90 days Material cost ratio 35,3% 24,21% 23,87%
Interest rate of short-term (bridging) loans 8% Depreciation of machinery and equipment 4% Accounts payable 30 days Ratio of other expenditures 21,2% 13,27% 13,26%
Interest rate on securities 4% Mid-term overhaul, concerning 30% of equipment Other l iabilities 1 monthly personnel cost + VAT position
Payment to CNFF (EUR/MWh) 6,0 EUR/MWh VAT 27%
Model results: NPV (in million euro)
Subsribed (registered) capital (2025) 2 500 Investment 2026-2035  2036-2045 2046-2055
NPV  r=5% in real terms (explicite  period) -3 262 mEUR Maximum of additional capital injections 6 606 94 198 158 341 50 247 86
NPV with residual value (r=5%) -2 976 mEUR Maximum of additional loans 3 542
Overall 12 648
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Development of the equity financing position and the NPV at 5% discount rate 
Cumulated capital increase/dividend Cumulated bridging loan from owner Cumulated present value of CF to equity r=5%  (right axis)
The left axis shows the  capital and loan financing of the Hungarian party of the project in current prices. The right axis 
demonstates the accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
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Cash flows to equity and additional loan financing (million EUR)
FCFE Bridging loan (from owner)* Cumulated present value of CF to equity r=5%  (right axis)
Left axis shows the FCFE and the additional (briging) loans from owner (or external banks) in nominal prices.(Capital injection or additional loan to 
company showed with negative values, while dividend or loan repayment il lustrated with positive values.) The right axis demonstates the 
accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
*Value is negative if the company requires additional loans to operation, positive in case of repayment the earlier loans.
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Appendix 4 - Model application results assuming a 50% power price growth in real terms 
 
  
Parameters of the current run of the model Paks-1 Fact
2008-2014 2026-2055 2056-2085
Planned capacity util ization during the lifetime of Paks-1 85% Dividend ratio based on yearly after tax profit 80% Working capital items EBIT/Sales 17,2% 34,93% 51,24%
Planned capacity util ization after the decommissioning of Paks-1 92% Corporate tax rate 16% Accounts receivables 30 days EBITDA/Sales 28,7% 58,38% 58,88%
Power price growth at real prices until  2026 50% Local business tax 2% Inventories 1 year (nuclear fuel) Personnel cost ratio 18,0% 10,06% 9,85%
Inflation rate (euro zone) 1,5% Depreciation rate of real property 2% Investment accounts payable 90 days Material cost ratio 35,3% 20,17% 19,89%
Interest rate of short-term (bridging) loans 8% Depreciation of machinery and equipment 4% Accounts payable 30 days Ratio of other expenditures 21,2% 11,39% 11,38%
Interest rate on securities 4% Mid-term overhaul, concerning 30% of equipment Other l iabilities 1 monthly personnel cost + VAT position
Payment to CNFF (EUR/MWh) 6,0 EUR/MWh VAT 27%
Model results: NPV (in million euro)
Subsribed (registered) capital (2025) 2 500 Investment 2026-2035  2036-2045 2046-2055
NPV  r=5% in real terms (explicite  period) -952 mEUR Maximum of additional capital injections 2 966 94 198 91 671 520 0
NPV with residual value (r=5%) -343 mEUR Maximum of additional loans 3 093
Overall 7 742
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Development of the equity financing position and the NPV at 5% discount rate 
Cumulated capital increase/dividend Cumulated bridging loan from owner Cumulated present value of CF to equity r=5%  (right axis)
The left axis shows the  capital and loan financing of the Hungarian party of the project in current prices. The right axis 
demonstates the accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
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FCFE Bridging loan (from owner)* Cumulated present value of CF to equity r=5%  (right axis)
Left axis shows the FCFE and the additional (briging) loans from owner (or external banks) in nominal prices.(Capital injection or additional loan to 
company showed with negative values, while dividend or loan repayment il lustrated with positive values.) The right axis demonstates the 
accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
*Value is negative if the company requires additional loans to operation, positive in case of repayment the earlier loans.
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Appendix 5 - Model application results assuming a 75% power price growth in real terms 
 
 
Parameters of the current run of the model Paks-1 Fact
2008-2014 2026-2055 2056-2085
Planned capacity util ization during the lifetime of Paks-1 85% Dividend ratio based on yearly after tax profit 80% Working capital items EBIT/Sales 17,2% 43,94% 57,92%
Planned capacity util ization after the decommissioning of Paks-1 92% Corporate tax rate 16% Accounts receivables 30 days EBITDA/Sales 28,7% 64,04% 64,46%
Power price growth at real prices until  2026 75% Local business tax 2% Inventories 1 year (nuclear fuel) Personnel cost ratio 18,0% 8,63% 8,44%
Inflation rate (euro zone) 1,5% Depreciation rate of real property 2% Investment accounts payable 90 days Material cost ratio 35,3% 17,29% 17,05%
Interest rate of short-term (bridging) loans 8% Depreciation of machinery and equipment 4% Accounts payable 30 days Ratio of other expenditures 21,2% 10,05% 10,04%
Interest rate on securities 4% Mid-term overhaul, concerning 30% of equipment Other l iabilities 1 monthly personnel cost + VAT position
Payment to CNFF (EUR/MWh) 6,0 EUR/MWh VAT 27%
Model results: NPV (in million euro)
Subsribed (registered) capital (2025) 2 500 Investment 2026-2035  2036-2045 2046-2055
NPV  r=5% in real terms (explicite  period) 1 591 mEUR Maximum of additional capital injections 1 216 94 198 36 212 0 0
NPV with residual value (r=5%) 2 643 mEUR Maximum of additional loans 3 093
Overall 5 766
Model
Yearly average subsidies from the owner (mHUF)
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Development of the equity financing position and the NPV at 5% discount rate 
Cumulated capital increase/dividend Cumulated bridging loan from owner Cumulated present value of CF to equity r=5%  (right axis)
The left axis shows the  capital and loan financing of the Hungarian party of the project in current prices. The right axis 
demonstates the accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
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Cash flows to equity and additional loan financing (million EUR)
FCFE Bridging loan (from owner)* Cumulated present value of CF to equity r=5%  (right axis)
Left axis shows the FCFE and the additional (briging) loans from owner (or external banks) in nominal prices.(Capital injection or additional loan to 
company showed with negative values, while dividend or loan repayment il lustrated with positive values.) The right axis demonstates the 
accumulated yearly present values in constant 2015 prices at 5% discount rate.
*Value is negative if the company requires additional loans to operation, positive in case of repayment the earlier loans.
 
